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Nation-building as both a process of ethnic primordial actuality and social construction is often observed as an elite-led process (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966; Brubaker, 1996; Barr and Skrbiš, 2008).​[2]​  This has been particularly the case in former Soviet Central Asia, and especially Kazakhstan. Faced with the task of creating a modern independent nation where there had been none previously, and where at the time of independence in 1991 ethnic Kazakhs were in a minority, the government of Kazakhstan led by its first and only President so far, Nursultan Nazarbayev, have in parts instituted a process of nation-building akin to Roger Brubaker’s notion of a nationalising state (Akçali, 2004; Bohr, 1998; Cummings, 2006; Ferrando, 2008).​[3]​ In a ‘nationalising state’ ruling elites are invested in promoting the titular national majority though language policy, symbols and cultural reproduction in order to foster a common sense of belonging, while also assimilating and incorporating other ethnic groups (Brubaker, 2011: 1786). The idea of a nationalising state evokes a top-down process where notions of national identity and nationhood will be received and accepted by the ethnic titular majority. However, research has illustrated that nationalising policies are often contested by mid and local-level actors and that post-Soviet elites do not possess a monopoly on the interpretation of nationhood (Polese, 2011). Nation-building as an on-going process is not reducible to just the elite-led vision of what constitutes nationhood and national identity. Rather, nation-building policies are received by audiences at different levels (local, regional, national etc.), where varying concepts of what constitutes the nation and national identity are contested and negotiated by multiple actors within this process (Connor, 1990: 100). 
This article seeks to examine the contested nature of nationhood and the titular national identity in Kazakhstan through the competing (and at times complementary) narratives within Kazakh cinematic works. While film could be considered tangential to broader structural processes underpinning nation-building, as Michael Billig has reminded us, every day banal, yet ideological habits allow nations to reproduce a common ‘imagined’ sense of nationhood amongst its members (e.g. flags, national anthems etc) (Billig, 1995: 6-7). Film (and/or television) is equal to any banal representation of nationhood and can play a role in the reproduction of the nation. As Sally Cummings has noted, ‘cinematic works, in their distillations of time and space, contribute to the kinds of imaginings that sustain nation-states’ (Cummings, 2009: 637). Therefore, an analysis of Kazakh film is ideally suited for exploring the contested nature of post-Soviet Kazakhstan’s nation-building, and revealing the various narratives within this process. 
This examination of Kazakh cinema highlights two key findings. Firstly, rather than just a top-down ethno-centric vision of nationhood and national identity, nation-building in Kazakhstan is far more complex and there exists multiple interpretations of the nation within cinematic works (Surucu, 2002: 389). As such, the analysis highlights four broad narratives pertaining to notions of the Kazakh nation and identity in film: 1) an exclusive ethno-centric narrative; 2) an inclusive ‘civic’ discourse; 3) a narrative which explores the religious foundation of the Kazakh nation and 4) a discourse which emphasises the socio-economic tensions of post-Soviet nation-building. These discursive strands, however, are often complementary as well as competing. Many directors and agents involved in the production of film are not bound to a particular discursive strand. Instead there exists a fluidity with agents moving between some of the strands, and this is particularly the case with the ethno-centric and civic strands as they represent the institutionalised tension within the regime-driven strategy of promoting both a nationalist and ethnic form of nationalism (Ó’Beacháin and Kevlihan, 2011). Similar to Bhavna Dave’s findings on Kazakh language and ethnicity, the fluidity of these discourses within film highlight the hybrid nature of post-Soviet institutions and identities in Kazakhstan (Dave, 2007). Second the discourse which emphasises the socio-economic tensions of nation-building in Kazakhstan reveals, much like the role of cinema in Soviet society, how film can provide a public space for dissent, satire and critique. This is significant because whereas conventional political institutions for dissent are marginalised and do not provide genuine sites of resistance to the regime, film which depicts alternative narratives regarding the socio-economic dimensions of the nation-building process in Kazakhstan, does provide a public outlet for the daily frustrations and difficulties of ordinary citizens. 
This article proceeds by developing these two findings through an analytical framework premised on a post-modern interpretive understanding of the as being invented and imagined through narrative, symbols, myths and history. It uses this to unpack the four discourses of nationhood and identity observed in recent Kazakh film. Methodologically it draws upon: a qualitative assessment of film and nation-building in Kazakhstan rooted in an interpretative analysis of a number of films from 2005-2013 which either explicitly or implicitly address notions of nationhood and national identity; interviews with a number of directors both associated with the state film company Kazakhfilm and independent from it; interviews with film critics; and an analysis of film reviews and newspaper articles.​[4]​ 
Post-Modern Nation-building
The post-modern literature on nationalism understands the nation as invented and constructed (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Smith, 1998:117-137). Hobsbawm, in particular, has stressed that the nation emerges from something approximating an ‘invented tradition’. According to Hobsbawm, this is ‘taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). In this sense the nation is constructed by modern elites and intellectuals as they deliberately select and rework old traditions, symbols, memories, myths and narratives for a population which has to be prepared and willing to accept them as shared commonalities, and/or be based on pre-existing social and cultural networks. Tradition, therefore, is an interpretive process that embodies both continuity and discontinuity with the past (Handler and Linnekin, 1984: 273). 
Discursively constructed nationalising projects, however, are not just an ideological apparatus of power (Bhabha, 1990: 3). Rather, nation-building is an ambivalent process which ‘emerges from a growing awareness that, despite the certainty with which historians speak of the ‘origins’ of the nation as a sign of ‘modernity’ of society, the cultural temporality of the nation inscribes a much more transitional social reality’ (Bhabha, 1990: 1). Bhabha’s idea of ambivalence in the discursive construction of the nation draws our attention to the obscured and marginalised counter narratives which contest the symbolic unity of the nation as found in narratives put forward by ruling elites (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 49-50). Consequently, an ambivalent reading of the nation introduces alternative sites of the meaning of the nation and opens up the possibility of processes of social change (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 50). While some draw this as a shift from modernity to post-modernity and the diminishment of the nation-state (Gibbins and Reimer, 1999 cited in Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 50), the lack of cultural uncertainty around the concept of the nation and identity can also act as a driver of change within a authoritarian state, providing sites of dissent and a public space for political satire and critique, which formal state institutions such as government, parties and unions are often unable to solicit. 
There has been a recent spate of scholarship on how Central Asian leaders imbue a sense of common belonging and nationhood through symbolic representations, reinterpretations of myths and broad discursive narratives (Cummings, 2010; Adams, 2010). While Anthony Smith (1998) may reject an approach to nationalism rooted interpretation, subjectivity and imagination, this work adopts an investigation similar to that of Laura Adams in her study of culture and national identity in Uzbekistan in that the object of study is not national identity per se, but the construction, reinvention and re-imagination of identity (Adams, 2010: 12). Such an interpretative approach is appropriate given that in the post-Soviet space one of the most contested areas of state policy is the interpretation of the past (Polese and Wylegala, 2008:788). 
Nation-Building and Film in post-Soviet Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan only came into being as a modern sovereign independent nation-state with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nonetheless, the ethno-genesis of the Kazakh nation stretches back to the 15th Century when a number of disparate tribes of Turkish speaking Uzbek-Turkic stock established the Kazakh Khanate under the leadership of Dzhanibek and Girei Khan (Olcott, 1987:9-16). The Khanate disintegrated two centuries later as consequence of tribal divisions and external invasion. This also coincided with Russian incursion and eventual colonisation of the region. In the time since, conceptions of Kazakh nationhood and identity have evolved through the prism of Russian and Soviet control of the region. Kazakh history was often told by Russian scholars, or Russian educated Kazakhs, while it was the Soviets who established the current boundaries of Kazakhstan by establishing the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic  as part of the national delimitation process of the 1920s and 30s. Moreover, despite official Soviet-Marxist ideology proclaiming the unity of classes, the Soviets sought to promote national identity in Kazakhstan and empowered local Kazakh elites through policies of affirmative action (Dave, 2007 5-6). Therefore, simultaneously the Soviet authorities allowed for a flourishing of Kazakh national identity while also incorporating Kazakhs into a common Soviet identity and ideology (Fierman, 1995). Furthermore, the demographic constituency of the Kazakh nation was further influenced by the settlement of Russians from the 18th Century onwards and the mass deportations of other ethnicities into the country during the 1930s and 40s. Therefore, conceptions and notions of Kazakh nationhood at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union had been constructed through both external and internal agents, shaped as much by Russian and Soviet involvement as by any clearly defined direct lineage back to the Kazakh Khanate of the 15th Century. 
It is this ambiguous and complex nationalising legacy which has served to provide the ambivalent and contested nature of the post-Soviet nation-building process in Kazakhstan. As such it draws our attention to four broad conceptions of nationhood found in scholarly work and government policy in the post-Soviet period. Firstly, the ruling regime has lifted the titular Kazakh nationality to the standing of primus inter pares through nationalising policies which privilege the status of the local language and the ‘exclusion of members of non-eponymous groups from the echelons of power’, most notably the significant Russian minority in the country (Bohr, 1998: 139). This ethno-centric process of ‘Kazakhification’ has prompted many scholars to adopt Brubaker’s notion of a nationalising state when considering post-Soviet nation-building in Kazakhstan (Sarsembayev, 1999; Commericio, 2004; Cummings, 2006). Such nationalising policies may have seemed pertinent given ethnic Kazakhs were in a minority at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore, the promotion of Kazakh ethnicity was a way to ensure the survival of a sovereign Kazakhstan against potential Russian irredentism over the North of the country. Secondly, the ruling regime have also sought to adopt a civic conception of nationhood based on the idea of harmonious inter-ethnic relations. Quite naturally this sits in tension with the promotion of ethno-centrist policies and has led to a degree of inter-elite contestation between so-called cosmopolitans and nationalists (Ó’Beacháin and Kevlihan, 2011: 8; Surucu, 2002: 389-390; Sarsambayev, 1999). Thirdly, a further conception of national identity is rooted in the distinctive Turkic-Mongol religion of Tengrism. Promoted by a number of cultural elites this interpretation of the nation situates Kazakh cultural national identity within a pre-Islamic paradigm. It is an attempt to reconnect post-Soviet Kazakh national identity to its pre-Russian roots of a nomadic pastoralism; underpinned by a spiritual belief in the connection between Kazakhs, their land, animals and nature (Laruelle, 2007). Finally, some Kazakh scholars have argued that given the disparity of social, economic and cultural experiences between rural and urban populations any notion Kazakhs possess a common culture and identity is highly questionable (Masanov, 2002). What this highlights is how a common sense of belonging to a nation can be stymied by divergent socio-economic experiences which create alternative social realities of the nation from the ethno-centrist and civic imaginations of nationhood put forward by the regime. These four broad conceptions of nationhood have played out at the general level of state nation-building with the debate regarding ethnic versus a civic conception of nationhood being the most prominent. However, as will be discussed below, they are also vividly reflected in recent cinematic works in Kazakhstan. The importance of film in this respect is that it allows the other two conceptions (Tengrist and socio-economic) of nationhood the opportunity for a public forum, something which for a narrative of nationhood which exposes the socio-economic divisions of Kazakhstan is much needed given the marginalisation of any political opposition to the incumbent regime. 
In the literature on film and nationalism, state-led film policy is often portrayed as an agent of culture and identity formation which can aid the establishment of a common sense of national identity by revisiting myths, historical struggles and symbols (Van Gorp, 2011: 244). By ploughing significant resources and funding into the state run film company Kazakhfilm, it is little surprise scholars and Western media reports have understood the recent boom in Kazakh cinema as a government sponsored effort to shape a common sense of Kazakh nationhood based on past historical struggles and myths (Norris, 2012, Stern, 2008).​[5]​ However, as Higson notes:
 “the process of nationalist mythmaking is not simply an insidious (or celebratory work) of ideological production, but it also at the same time a means of setting one 	body of images and values against another, which will very often threaten to 	overwhelm the first. Histories of nationalist cinema can only therefore be really understood as histories of crisis and conflict, of resistance and negotiation” (Higson, 1989: 38). 
While it is possible to observe the government’s state funding of Kazakhfilm as attempt to use film policy as an ideological apparatus to re-imagine myths, histories, symbols and struggles of the past and reconstitute them as a common identity of the present, this particular imaginary of the nation, however, faces resistance from other imaginations of the nation. Within Kazakh cinematic works we can observe that there is no essential meaning given to Kazakh national identity, rather it is contested and constructed through various competing and complementary discursive tropes. What it illustrates is that while in the post-Soviet period Kazakhstan might be returning to the modernist project of nation-building it is doing so in post-modern conditions. The government is directing the nation-building process partially through the re-imagination and re-constitution of history. However, such a process is contested and ambivalent.
Notwithstanding the above, any understanding of the power of cinema as an agent of identity formation has to take into account audience reception. In other words, film can only contribute to identity formation if there is a receptive audience. An initial reading of the evidence would suggest that the cinema going public has only a passing interest in Kazakh cinema, indicating the limited reach of Kazakh films in populating the national consciousness.  In 2012 Kazakh films only constituted a 5 per cent market share of box office receipts which the remaining share made up with Hollywood blockbusters and Russian movies (Sabirov, 2013).  Nonetheless, taken in the context that in 2012 only 14 out of 281 films released in cinemas were Kazakh films, plus the unquantifiable impact of Internet downloads, the growing DVD market, and that film remains a developing industry in Kazakhstan, we can neither prove nor disprove conclusively the extent to which the population buy into the broader imagining of the nation as depicted in recent Kazakh cinematic works. Given 2012 broke box office records for Kazakh films in domestic cinemas, we can at the very least conclude the Kazakh cinema is on an upward trajectory in terms of the finances being invested and the importance it holds for both government agencies and independent studios in terms of furthering cultural development and offering a forum for broad debates and imaginaries regarding notions of nationhood and identity.​[6]​ Nonetheless, at the same time, the role of cinema in nation-building discourses also have to be understood as existing as part of a far wider nation-building process such as history teaching in school, language policy and national spectacles such as Independence Day (Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, 2011).​[7]​
The remainder of this article unpacks the four different narratives pertaining to the nation, nation-building and identity in Kazakh film which are highlighted above. They represent a complex and fluid set of discourses, but it is the narrative related to the socio-economic tensions of the nation which reflects most clearly the way in which film can provide a medium for resistance, dissent and critqiue.

Nomads and Warriors: The ethno-centric narrative of the Kazakh nation
In 2005 the Kazakh government turned the Kazakhfilm studios into a joint-stock company in which the state maintained the largest share, while also investing heavily in updating production facilities.​[8]​ This investment cemented the perception that ‘Kazakhfilm works on government orders’ and that ‘authors and directors have to work on themes in accordance with plans written by the ministry of culture’.​[9]​ Such top-down government involvement in determining topics for film productions impresses upon the observer the extent to which the government is utilising cinema as an ideological apparatus to put forward its vision of Kazakh nationhood and identity. The most notable strand of this elite-led vision is an exclusive ethno-centric discourse. Films such as Nomad (Kochevnik) (2005) and Myn Bala (Warriors of the Steppe) (2012)​[10]​ which both tell the story of Kazakhstan’s 18th Century struggle against the yoke of Mongolian Zungars​[11]​, all set against the background of the spectacular Steppe, are understood as attempts by the government to imbue a sense of unity, patriotism, pride and heroism amongst the ethnic Kazakh population. At the same time, through sponsoring films such as Mustafai Shoki (2008) and The Sky of My Childhood (Nebo moego detstva) (2011), the regime has also sought to construct and re-imagine particular heroes and characteristics of Kazakh national identity.
Nomad (2005) tells the tale of the coming of age of Ablimansur, his fight against the Mongolian Zungars and his eventual transformation into Ablai Khan, the great Kazakh statesman and warrior of the steppe. The premise of the film is that the three Kazakh Zhuzes (hordes) are disunited in the face of the threat from the Zungars and it is Ablimansur who emerges as the figure at the right time in history to unite the disparate Kazakh tribes and defeat the Zungars. This interpretation of history was largely perceived to be the government’s attempt to establish an official regime approved version of nation formation and the ethno-genesis of Kazakh national identity, as well as promoting patriotism and strengthening the national consciousness, something of a priority for Nazarbayev (Abikeyeva, 2006; Tengriznews, 2012). ​[12]​
The film, however, while appealing to patriotic and unifying ideals, has been criticised as a one-sided mythologisation of Kazakh history.​[13]​ While the central character, Ablimansur (Abli Khan), is factually exact, the events, battles and many other characters are not. The story of Ablai Khan, as portrayed through Nomad (2005), demonstrates how the authorities have attempted to establish a foundation myth for the Kazakh nation based on ethnic exclusivity. Yet, the film has been criticised for presenting Turkic mythology as Kazakh mythology in an effort to enhance the country’s image (Zvonkine, 2010). Myn Bala (2012) further fixates on the core theme of Kazakh unity, struggle and resistance against the Zungars. Similar to Nomad (2005) the film was viewed by critics as a direct attempt by the government through Kazakhfilm to promote Kazakh patriotism and a common accepted understanding of the defence of the nation.​[14]​
The reinvention of history in Kazakh cinema is not limited to revisiting perceived sites of the Kazakh nation’s conception in their struggle against the Zungars. Kazakhfilm directors Satybaldy Narymbetov and Slambek Tauyekel have sought to explore Kazakhstan’s Soviet past in an effort to find a sense of nation and self-identification. Narymbetov, for instance, has argued they are seeking ‘to find how we are different from other nations...metaphorically we are sitting in front of a huge mirror naked and studying ourselves. We make historical movies, not for entertainment, like they do in Hollywood; instead our goal is to introduce history to the younger generation so we can learn more about ourselves’.​[15]​ For example, Narymbetov attempts to achieve this in his biopic of Mustafa Shokai, the Kazakh-born leader of the short-lived Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan, which attempted to resist Bolshevik rule. The purpose of the film was to bring back Shokai from the ‘margins of history’ as a unifying figure for the present, yet critics question whether Shokai is a suitable hero for such a nation-building purpose due his ambiguity as a historical figure because of his cooption by the Nazis during the Second World War (Rouland, 2009).
Sky of my Childhood (2011) is a film which combines the instilling of ethno-centric patriotism with a re-invention of Kazakh Soviet history. The film depicts the early life and coming of age of Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. While some observe the film as one of the pieces of the presidential personality cult jigsaw, the movie still attempts to explore the nature of Kazakh national identity (Walker, 2011). The Sky of My Childhood (2011) symbolically portrays objects which are meant to represent a common belonging between Kazakhs (First, 2012). These symbols include: apples, horses, yurts, vistas of the mountains and the steppe, Islamic beliefs, rituals and practices, the mythic fable of Bayterek and Samruk,​[16]​ respect for older people, the nomadic pastoral way of life, the dombra​[17]​ and the game Kokpar.​[18]​ A number of these objects and themes, such as Bayterek and Samruk,  are part of oral Kazakh folk history from the 16th and 17th Centuries. However, they draw upon a Turkic mythology which modern-day Kazakhs share with other Turkic peoples who now reside in separate national groups such as the Turkish, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Chuvash among many others. It illustrates the difficulties the Kazakhstani authorities have in carving out a distinctive ethnic conception of Kazakh identity when it has a shared mythology with other Turkic groups. 
The role of language within the ethno-centric discursive strand reveals the complexity of presenting an ethnically exclusive version of Kazakh nationhood, particularly in relation to the country’s Russian and Soviet legacy. For example, while Myn Bala was promoted as a Kazakh language film (with Russian dubbed over the top and English subtitles prepared for international release), and therefore an apparent attempt to offer an ethnically exclusive version of the film, Nomad, on the other hand, while pertaining towards ethnic exclusivity, actually featured non-Kazakhs in the lead roles with the Kazakh language only being dubbed over the top.​[19]​ The decision to use foreign actors and directors was a nod towards making the film as universally and appealing to foreign audiences as possible. Nomad and Myn Bala were part of a wider strategy of the Kazakhstani government to polish its international image (Lillis, 2011). In other films (Sky of my Childhood, Mustafa Shokai), the trend is for Kazakh to be used when Kazakhs are conversing and Russian language when Kazakhs are speaking with other nationalities. It is reflective of the complexity and fluidity of language in Kazakhstan.​[20]​ 

If the grass grows on the entrance to your house: the multi-ethnic and civic conception of the Kazakh nation in film 
The issue of language alerts us to a further discourse within Kazakh film which emphasises the ‘civic’ and inclusive nature of national identity. Here the nation is understood as being ethnically and religiously diverse with Kazakh characteristics being openness, friendless and hospitality. These features, as suggested through the prism of film, are rooted in the geography and topology of the Kazakh landscape and the country’s experience of Soviet rule. Moreover, in political terms, the discourse pertains to a vision of the Kazakh nation in which citizenship is inclusive. Rather than Kazakhstan being a nation built around ethnic Kazakhs it is instead a nation of Kazakhstanis. In other words, membership of the nation is based not on ethnicity but on those who found themselves citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
A civic conception of national identity can be understood in relation to Kazakhstan’s nomadic past and the relationship between its peoples, the steppe and its location between East and West. The steppe, with its vast openness and lack of geographical boundaries, has defined the national characteristics of Kazakhs. The paucity of a natural frontier, and that the steppe was a resting place for travelers and caravans on passage through the old-Silk Road, has meant, according to the director Slambek Tauyekel, Kazakhs have developed friendliness, tolerance and hospitality as national characteristics.​[21]​ These perceived distinguishing features are often represented by central characters in Kazak films. For instance, in Ermek Tursunov’s Shal (Old Man) (2012), a film loosely based on Ernest Hemmingway’s Old Man and the Sea, the lead protagonist Kasym is perceived to personify Kazakh national identity in terms of his kindness, resilience and spirit.​[22]​ 
A Kazakh nation characterised by inter-ethnic harmony is most noted in films which re-imagine the impact of the forced settlement of different nationalities in Kazakhstan during the 1930s and 40s. Under Stalin, the large steppe territory of Akmola in northern Kazakhstan served as the ‘prison of nations’ (Pohl, 2002: 401).  In this period various ethnic groups were deported to Kazakhstan and wider Central Asia including Koreans, Poles, Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingush and Germans. In coming to Kazakhstan these groups faced squalid conditions, labour camps and the prospect of death. Rustem Abdrashev's A Gift for Stalin (Podarok Stalinu) (2008) tells the story of how a young Jewish boy, Sashka, was deported from Moscow to Kazakhstan. An elderly Kazakh rail worker, Kasym, takes on paternal responsibility for Sashka and endeavours to bring the boy up in the local village with other Kazakhs and deportees including Vera (a Russian) and a Polish doctor Dombrovskii. The film provides an imagination of Kazakh identity which is embodied in Kasym. Kasym teaches Sabyr the virtues of a simple, honest and rural way of life and to have kindness and respect for others (Miller, 2009). These values, and the ability of the ethnically diverse village to work together in harmony for the benefit of a new, young and vulnerable outsider, are juxtaposed to the brutal and violent terror created by the Soviet military and political classes, crystallised in the local policeman, Balgaba who frequently rapes Vera and other local Kazakh girls. A Gift to Stalin (2008) was mostly well received in Kazakhstan particularly for the way it embodied national characteristics within Kasym. The only substantial criticism, similar to some of the comments aimed at Nomad (2005) concerned the extent of its accuracy in depicting the historical period of the late 1940s (Seytimov, 2010; Razumov, 2008).
Slambek Tauyekel’s Zheruiyk (The Promise Land) (2011) also depicts Kazakh national identity as one of tolerance, openness and hospitality.​[23]​ The film provides a re-imagined account of the Stalinist deportations of different ethnic groups to Kazakhstan in the period from 1937 to 1945. Beginning with the deportation of Koreans to the steppe in 1937 – Kazakh national identity is embodied in the character of Oreke, the head of a local collective farm, who encourages local Kazakhs to take in the Koreans, look after them, provide them with clothes, shelter and bedding, and to protect their interests from the arbitrary repression of Soviet authorities. The different ethnicities are observed as living harmoniously and in unity in face of the on-going threat of Soviet repression. Satybaldy Narymbetov sums up this multi-ethnic ‘civic’ discourse embodied in Zheruiyk (2011) by reference to an ancient Kazakh proverb noting that: ‘there is a curse: “if the grass grows on the entrance to your house”. It is a terrible curse, because it means that no guest will enter your house. We do not want this; we want more people coming to us. It means our house is never empty.’​[24]​
	While these films represent a very different invention and formation of the Kazakh nation and national identity from that portrayed in the ethno-centric discourse, at the same time, funded through Kazakhfilm, and with the support of the government, Zheruiyk (2011) and A Gift for Stalin (2008) also complement the exclusive ethno-centric premise and purpose of Nomad (2005) and Myn Bala (2012).​[25]​ It allows the regime to draw on different aspects of the ‘Kazakh’ tradition, highlighting the connection between the Steppe and the characteristics of the Kazakh people, and the Western inspired notion of ‘civic’ modern nationhood. Nonetheless, there is a degree of friction between the two discourses with national characteristics such as openness, hospitality and tolerance conflicting with macho-warrior attributes of Kazakhs depicted in the patriotic ethno-centric discourse. 
A hymn to mother: religious identity of the Kazakh nation in film
The third discursive strand concerns the religious underpinning of Kazakh national identity. This discourse can be observed most notably in Ermek Tursunov’s film Kelin (the bride) (2009) although religious identity is addressed tangentially in a number of Kazakh films including some discussed here such as Zheruiyk (2011), The Sky of My Childhood (2011) and A Gift for Stalin (2008). The film also reveals a different conception of nation formation situated in notions of motherhood. 
Kelin (2009) locates the Kazakh nation and identity in a pre-Islamic Central Asia prior to the Arab incursion into the region in the 8th Century. The prevailing religious beliefs and practice of this time, and which is at the forefront of Kelin (2009), is Tengrism. Tengrism refers to the Turkic-Mongol cult of the sky god traditionally practiced amongst Turkic-Mongol peoples (Laruelle, 2007: 204). It is a monotheistic religion grounded in shamanistic, totemistic and animistic beliefs and practices where humans, animals, plants and spirits exist in a symbiotic relationship. Importantly, however, it has re-emerged among some post-Soviet Central Asian national intellectual elites ‘as a key element in the identity renewal of Turkic–Mongol peoples’ (Laruelle, 2007: 203). While any such Tengrist political movement has been marginal in Kazakhstan that it should feature so prominently in Kelin is illustrative of the extent to which Tengrism represents a challenge to the notion that the Central Asian states should be, and are identified as, Islamic. Speaking of Tursunov’s motives with the reconstituted depiction of Tengrist practices and beliefs in Kelin, Oleg Boretskii suggests that it illustrates how Tursunov sees ‘Tengrism as the spiritual base that used to exist in Kazakhstan; its nomadic spirituality, and that Tengrism and not Islam is the religion of Kazakhs’.​[26]​ A film without words, Kelin (2009) tells the tale of a young bride who is sold off to the wealthiest suitor who happens not be her first choice, however, she adapts to the arrangement, learns strength of character (overseen by the powerful and authoritative mother-in-law), develops her own sexual agency (by becoming involved in a love quadrilateral), and eventually becomes a strong and independent individual (Graham, 2009). 
Kelin (2009) symbolically depicts the centrality of Tengrism to Kazakh identity through the lingering shots of animals (owls, wolves, crows etc), purposely drawing our attention to the relationships between man, animals and spiritual world. This evoking, re-imagining of Tengrism rests on a hope of those reconstructing it for post-Soviet Central Asia ‘for reconnecting with the past: nomadism, yurts, cattle breeding, the contact with nature, all those elements that form part of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh national imaginative world which people have tried to rehabilitate since the disappearance of the Soviet Union and its ideology’ (Laruelle, 2006). Tursunov, through his film, is attempting to re-imagine and reconstitute Tengrism as part of Kazakhstan’s national identity connecting the religion with Kazakhstan’s nomadic past and its bond with the steppe and the mountains. As Tursunov explains, ‘the nomad was tied to his cattle: he followed his cattle wherever it went. This is why for the nomad the land is infinite...this is the source of the nomad’s worldview and religion. We did not have Islam here, we were pagans, Tengerians. It was a cult of fire, a cult of the mountains and a cult of ancestors’.​[27]​
While notions of religious identity of the Kazakh nation are explored through Tengrism, perhaps an even more powerful evocation of nation-building in the film is centred on the role of women. Central to the film is the portrayal of strong and powerful women and Kelin (2009) evokes the idea of returning Kazakhstan to the ‘primary, pre-historical values of the continuation of family and the role of women in this process’.​[28]​ From this perspective, the film proposes a very different foundation myth of the Kazakh nation. In Kelin (2009) the nation is not born in the bloody battles of struggle against invaders as in Nomad (2005) and Myn Bala (2012), nor is it born through the external actions such as forced deportations as in Zheruiyk (2011) and A Gift for Stalin (2008), but instead it is born as all nations are born, in families and through reproduction. Symbolically Kelin (2009) can be represented as the mother of the nation. Indeed, Boretskii suggests the film is a ‘hymn for mother’ and equally a film for the motherland.​[29]​
Kelin (2009) divided audiences on its release. The perceived promiscuous nature of the lead female character was even discussed in the Mazhilis (Parliament) where it was felt the portrayal of women in such a way was an insult to the dignity of Kazakh women (Bekeeva, 2010). Initially, the censors wanted to the cut the sex scenes in the film, but Tursunov refused to back down and the film was eventually released in its uncut form and was nominated as Kazakhstan’s entry to the foreign film category for the Oscars (Mostovoi, 2009).  The focus on Tengrism also drew criticism because the primitive rituals which can be observed in the film, alongside the absence of perceptibly ‘Kazakh’ symbols such as the dombra and sheep (there are many animals represented, but not sheep), where perceived not to meet ‘Kazakh’ traditions (Burdin, 2009). That such a deep and philosophical film as Kelin (2009) caused such outrage from some elements of the viewing public, particularly as the film was chosen to represent Kazakhstan at the Oscars, only denotes the contested nature of conceptions of the Kazakh nation and identity in film. Moreover, it illustrates the way in which film can provide a public space for alternative imaginaries of the nation, something which is even more evident in the socio-economic discursive strand identified in recent Kazakh cinematic works. 
Butter, Drugs and Bureaucrats: socio-economic tensions of nation-building in Kazakhstan
The final narrative considered in this article concerns the socio-economic dynamics of nation-building. What this discourse draws our attention to are sites of dissent, resistance and critique of the elite-led vision of modern Kazakh nationhood and the united sense of common belonging which other discourses evoke. Instead it portrays Kazakhstan as a fractured and disunited nation where divisions exist across society due to the social and economic realities of ordinary citizens’ lives. 
Within this discourse the steppe, which is central symbolically to the geographical and topographical representation of the Kazakh nation in films such as Nomad (2005), Myn Bala (2012) and Sky of My Childhood (2011), is a very different environment. In films such as Tulpan (Tulip) (2008), Strayed (Zabludivishiisya) (2009) and Constructors (Stroiteli) (2013), the steppe is not the sumptuous, fertile and expansive land of beauty; it is a harsh, barren, infertile and desolate land. This depiction of the steppe is most noted in Tulpan (2008). The film tells the story of Asa who returns from military service to live on the steppe with his sister, her husband and children, who make their living herding sheep. In Tulpan (2008), Peter Hames argues the Kazakh steppe is portrayed in the film as a place of suffering for both humans and animals. 
The hostile nature of the steppe is also often used as a backdrop to illustrate the disorientation of key protagonists. In Akhan Stayev’s Strayed (2009) the main character finds he is lost in the steppe whilst driving with his wife and son. However, the lead protagonist’s disorientation speaks of larger issues of the social disorientation of modern Kazakhstan – the influence of criminal gangs and how the corruption of the modern world leads individuals to stray from a moral path. The Kazakh nation in Strayed (2009) is socially and economically dislocated. A similar form of disorientation occurs in Realtors (2011), where the lead character is temporally disoriented by finding himself in the past, but this temporal disorientation is symptomatic of his disorientation within modern society in that he is a loser and socially disaffected without a job and hope (Sekerbaeva, 2011). This disorientation depicts a very different form of membership of the nation. The Kazakh nation consists not of warriors or kind and generous heroes, but of ordinary people who suffer and struggle. 
The nature of this struggle can be observed in Aldikhan Yerzhanov’s film Constructors (2013). In the film two brothers and their younger sister are evicted from their apartment in town and find their only option is to build a house on tiny plot of land they own out in the steppe. The two brothers struggle not just with the dispossession of their flat and with constructing their own home, but also with state officials and bureaucrats who persistently place obstacles in their way and eventually threaten to tear down their construction for failing to meet arbitrary and ever changing rules. The film also details how the socio-economic struggle with officialdom antagonises the unity of the family. We are constantly made aware through the film of the tension which exists between the two brothers with the younger brother blaming the elder brother for their predicament. 
This struggle and resistance can also be seen in the short films directed by Serik Abishev. One film, Stop Bureaucrats (Ostanovite byurokraty) (2012), satirises officialdom and bureaucracy of the state by simply showing a series of ‘bureaucrats’ shuffling papers and moving them from one side of the desk to the other. In another short film, Butter (Maslo) (2012), a worker is paid only with a box of butter. The work of both Yerzhanov and Abishev is demonstrative of the way in which art can provide an alternative discursive strand which dissents from the prevailing official narrative of the regime. What is striking about Yerzhanov and Abishev’s work is how their satirical take on struggles with bureaucracy and officialdom is representative of a long tradition within Soviet cinema of film operating as a forum for critique of the political reality of everyday life. For example, there are parallels with their work and that of the 1976 Mosfilm production The Irony of Fate (Ironiya sudby, ili S lyogkim parom!) in the way each offers a critique of the pervasiveness of state bureaucracy in the everyday lives of citizens. 
Perhaps what is most notable, however, and is illustrative of the fluid nature of these different discursive strands is that Yerhzanov and Abishev have been funded in part by Kazakhfilm and rent production offices on the studio’s lot.​[30]​ Yet, the recurrent themes within their work speak of a very different Kazakhstan than perhaps the government would prefer.  It is one of struggle against the state and socio-economic disparity. Constructors (2013), is clearly speaking to us of nation-building in Kazakhstan. Yerzhanov himself has argued that the construction of the house in the film could be interpreted as the on-going construction of Kazakhstan.​[31]​ Moreover, the very opening shots of the film provide a pocketed guide to Kazakhstan’s history. We move at pace through a description of the different tribes and nomadic empires which historically existed on the Kazakh steppe to the Mongols and the 17th Century Kazakh Khanate all the way through to Kazakhstan being a Soviet republic before then becoming an independent state in the 1990s. Quite deliberately the voiceover then simply states ‘and now we are being evicted from our apartment for the non-payment of rent’. The film evokes Handler and Linnekin’s (1984) notion of continuity and discontinuity within national traditions, as it both connects and disconnects Kazakhstan’s supposed glorious pre-Soviet history (as nomads and the Kazakh Khanate) to the economic reality of ordinary citizens in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. 


The disparity of wealth in modern Kazakhstan is another facet of this particular discursive strand of nation-building in film. This is most evident in The Tale of the Pink Bunny (Skaz o rozovom zaitse) (2010), a film produced by Kazakhfilm studios and directed by Farkhat Sharipov. The film tells the tale of Erlan who leaves the provinces to study in Almaty. He finds himself trapped between two worlds: his more rural, humble and modest upbringing and the trappings of wealth and success of the young urban Kazakh elite that Erlan finds himself ingratiated into. The film depicts not just the disparity between the wealthy Almaty elite and Erlan, but also the immorality of desiring wealth accumulation above anything else. The degradation and moral corruption of Kazakh society in the post-Soviet period is a common theme among Kazakh directors. Akhan Satayev’s film Racketeer (Reketir) (2007) provides an account of early post-Soviet Almaty’s criminal gangs warring over territory to lucrative bazaars and protection rackets. Yet it too offers a morality tale of the modern Kazakh nation. The main protagonist’s descent into criminality is a consequence of his general despondency with the lack of economic opportunities in the post-Soviet economy. 
The key themes noted above within this discursive strand: the barrenness of the steppe, disorientation, struggles with officialdom and bureaucracy, and social and economic dislocation are in stark contrast with government sponsored cinematic works which attempt to project an image of Kazakhstan as a successful, prosperous and modern nation. The TV mini-series, Astana My Love (Astana- lyubov’ moya) (2010), jointly produced between Kazakhfilm and the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, attempts to depict  Kazakhstan, and in particular Nazarbayev’s pet-project capital city Astana, as a young, modern, vibrant and affluent city which provides its citizens with a life style comparable to that on offer in the West. While the 2009 film The Leap of Afaliny (Pryzhok Afaliny) (2009), written and produced by the Minister of Defence Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, also shows Kazakhstan and Astana in a very stylised and modern fashion. The cinematography constantly provides shots of Astana’s gleaming futuristic buildings drenched in sunshine, while scenes in Moscow (part of the film is set in the Russian capital) are dreary, mundane and rain sodden. The film presents an invention of modern Kazakhstan nationhood which jars with the discursive strand within cinema which depicts post-Soviet Kazakhstan as a site of significant socio-economic tension. In this discursive strand, as noted above, we see Kazakhstan not as a united country, but one where divisions exist between rich and poor, the people and the state, legality and illegality, the urban and rural and between morality and immorality. 
The reception for many of the films discussed within this discursive strand was broadly positive. The exponential growth of the Kazakh film industry and the growing success of domestic-produced films is often a point of national pride even if some of these films touch upon difficult issues of social and economic division. The criticisms which do emerge come in broadly two forms, and both are particularly revealing in terms of the contested nature of nation-building. Firstly, the depiction of the steppe as barren and infertile in Tulpan (2008), and the portrayal of the challenges of rural Kazakh life were taken by some officials as to be promoting Kazakhstan as a backward and patriarchal country to the extent that it would do more damage to Kazakhstan’s international image than Borat (Ramm, 2008). The reaction to Tulpan in this respect is illustrative of how the film does provide an alternative and perceptibly critical imaginary of modern Kazakhstan to that which government officials wish to portray. Secondly, criticisms have come from the artistic community themselves who have suggested that films such as Strayed (2009), Racketeer (2007) and The Tale of the Pink Bunny (2010) rely too much on evoking the style and production values of Hollywood films and lack the artistic merit of new wave films such as The Needle (Igla) (1989). In doing so it is suggested these films fail fail to address the socio-economic condition of modern Kazakhstan in any depth (Yuritsyn, 2011). By adopting the pretension of modern Hollywood films the concern on part of these critics is that a distinctive sense of Kazakh cinematic national-self is being over awed by the forces of globalisation (or Americanisation). However, this is perhaps unfair because as seen above these films do provide alternative imaginaries of the Kazakh nation. Moreover, they are also able to do so by reaching wider audiences because of their more commercial cinematic style. 
Conclusion
This analysis of recent cinematic works in Kazakh film illustrates the degree of complexity around narratives related to nationhood and national identity within post-Soviet Kazakhstan. While there is an elite-led nationalising discourse within film policy which offers simultaneously conflicting and complementary narratives of the nation and national identity, in the ethno-centric and ‘civic’ discourses, these regime-approved narratives face competition from alternative cinematic dialogues relating to the religious basis of the Kazakh nation and the socio-economic tensions of the nation and national identity. This illustrates that there is no single agent (i.e. the regime) driving identity formation within Kazakh film. Rather notions of the nation and national identity are ambiguous, re-invented and negotiated by various actors including some who have links with the state-funded Kazakhflim, again demonstrating the internal conflict inherent within any regime-driven attempt to establish a homogenous conception of Kazakh nationhood and national identity. 
A post-modern lens of understanding nation-building as discursively constructed has also revealed marginalised sites of dissent and resistance to the regime-approved invention of the Kazakh nation. The discourse in Kazakh cinema which draws inspiration from the socio-economic challenges faced by its citizens offers a very different interpretation of Kazakh nationhood. It unpeels the veneer of stability and prosperity of modern nation as depicted in films such as The Leap of Afaliny (2009) and Astana My Love (20110) as well as observing that Kazakhstan is not the unified nation forged in nomadic tribal struggle centuries ago, but a fractured and disoriented nation in which its members fight back against state domination.
Given that formal mechanisms and institutions for resistance and opposition in Kazakhstan are marginalised with the opposition and independent media effectively muted and the political system organised to work for the Nazarbayev regime, art and film offers one remaining area where dissent and an alternative discourse regarding nationhood and social and economic issues can emerge. It is one of the last bastions where a depiction of the reality of life for millions of Kazakhs can be observed. Films such as Constructors (2013), Butter (2012) and Tulpan (2008) while at the margins of the Kazakh cinema industry do offer a cultural foundation for social change in the same way perhaps cinema did during the Soviet period. During the Soviet era even though produced by the state film company Mosfilm (and its Kazakh sibling Kazakhfilm studios) cinema often offered veiled critiques of the Soviet system and alternative narratives regarding political, economic and social life from that those put forward by Kremlin apparatchiks, and this was particularly the case with the so-called ‘slice of life’ films which alarmed conservative critics by portraying social problems within the Soviet Union (Youngblood, 1992). Current Kazakh cinema maintains this Soviet tradition of film and art being a mechanism of dissent and critique. Cinema creates a public space where alternative imaginations of nationhood from those put forward by the regime can exist. 
The question which remains is the extent to which Kazakhstan is unique in this respect and the extent to which the complexity and fluidity of discourses and narratives pertaining to nation-building observed in cinematic works are mirrored not just in similar nation-building processes in Central Asia or the former Soviet Union, but in a temporal sense too in the nation-building projects of 19th Century Western Europe or the African and Middle Eastern post-colonial transitions of the post-war period. Further research is required in a more comparative sense of the extent to which these discourses of nationhood in post-Soviet Kazakhstan are able to speak of broader and more general trends in the process of nation-building, or whether the narratives of nationhood and identity in Kazakh cinema instead alert us to the uniqueness of the Kazakh case. 
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^1	  The author would like to extend thanks to Nikolay Shevchenko and Max Tyan for research assistance on this project.
^2	  Nation-building is a process in which a political agent or set of political agents seeks to convince people living on the same administrative territory (the state) that they belong to the same political, social, cultural and economic community (Polese, 2011:40).  
^3	  In 1991 at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union only 40 percent of the population were Kazakh, while 37 percent were Russian.
^4	  2005 was chosen as a departure point for this study because it was the year after which the government began investing heavily in Kazakhfilm, and was precipitated by a government resolution which saw the studios become a joint-stock company (with the government as the largest shareholder). Focusing the analysis from 2005 onwards is not meant to dismiss earlier periods of Kazakh cinema which played a role in both inspiring and drawing on debates regarding nationhood and national and ethnic identity. Cinematic history in Kazakhstan has been punctuated by flourishing periods of creativity in this respect most notably during the Brezhnev era and the late Soviet glasnost period when the artistic credibility and success of Kazakh cinema in Western Europe led to the so-called ‘new wave’ of Kazakh cinema (Abikeyeva, 2006a). Despite the recent boom in the film industry productions of films remain limited in comparison to the West. Therefore, films selected for analysis were chosen from a small pool and on the basis of those which most recognisably address issues of nationhood, national identity and nation formation.
^5	  The shift to a state-led film policy within Kazakhstan’s cinema industry is in stark contrast to what preceded it. During the Soviet period there was significant state involvement in the production of film, while at the same time, especially during 1950s to 1970s there were efforts, on the part of esteemed director and actor Shaken Aimanov, among others, to promote a distinct Kazakh identity, culture and history through cinematic works. This  sat in tension with the communist regime’s attempts to create a Homo Sovieticus. The late Soviet period, and the early post-Soviet period of Kazakh cinema in contrast was dominated by independent auteurs such as Ardak Amirkulov, Serik Aprymov, Darezhan Omirbayev and Rashid Nugmanov. They drew influence from European cinema and attempted through cinema to deconstruct the Soviet mentality of the past and reflect upon the internal tensions and fissures of post-Soviet society and economy (Nogberk 2013; Abikeyeva 2013). The post-Soviet period up until 2005 was one in which the Kazakh cinema industry remained under-invested in, few films were produced and where directors often had to seek financing from foreign studios. While this article is not primarily concerned with the development of the Kazakh industry per say, it is helpful to provide this short context to understand the point at which the Kazakhstani government began to re-assert itself vis-à-vis the cinema industry in an effort to use film to promote its perceived conception of nationhood and identity and interpretation of historical memory. 
^6	  For instance, 2012 saw an increase in the number of people watching major films in the Kazakh language and an increase in the sale of DVDs of Kazakh films. Moreover, individual ticket sales in 2012 were 13.4 million, an increase of 6 million since 2008 (Sabirov, 2008).
^7	  Television is perhaps no more or less important than film in terms of acting as a medium in nation-building. Just like cinema, Kazakh television also relies on imports from Russia, Turkey and the West. Programmes depicting national traditions, customs, music etc, can be found, especially on national holidays, but it is hard to determine viewing figures or the extent of their resonance. 
^8	  The Kazakh government funded a modernisation program of the film studios in 2006 and provided a budget of $70 million dollars over three year periods.
^9	  Author’s interview with Ermek Tursunov, Film Director, Almaty, Kazakhstan 8 November 2012.
^10	  For the purposes of readability most film names will be directly translated from Russian to English such as Kochevnik being translated as Nomad. However, in cases where a direct translation is not so easily understood, most notably in the case of Kazakh names for films, such as Myn Bala, the original Kazakh transliteration will be used.
^11	  Zungars refers to the collective identity of three Western Mongolian Oirat tribes (Oöled, Dörvöd and Khoit). The term Zungar is Russian-centric in that it was utilised by Russian and Soviet historians and ethnographers and neglects to recognise that historically Western Mongolians referred to themselves as either Oriats or by their respective tribal names. However, given the term Zungar is ubiquitously used in the films Nomad and Myn Bala, and in the commentary and reviews of these films, this article will use the term Zungar, if only for the purposes of clarity with the given subject matter. 
^12	  Author’s interview, Oleg Boretskii, film critic, Almaty, Kazakhstan 8 November 2012.
^13	  Author’s Interview Oleg Boretskii.
^14	  Author’s interviews with Gulnara Abikeyeva, film critic, and Oleg Boretskii, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 5 and 8 November 2012.
^15	  Author’s interview with Satybaldy Narymbetov, KazakhFilm Director,  Almaty, Kazakhstan, 6 November 2012
^16	  Bayterk is the Turkic symbol for the tree of life in which a huge birds nest is situated at the very top of the tree in which the mythical bird Samruk was said to have laid its egg. 
^17	  The Dombra is a long-necked lute-like three-stringed instrument which is traditionally played throughout Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and among Tatar and Bashkir populations in the Russian Federation.
^18	  Kokpar is a Kazakh game played on horseback in which two teams compete to carry a headless goat carcass over the goal line. However, Kokpar is played widely across the broader Central Asian region in varying formats and under different names for example Buzkashi in Afghanistan.
^19	  It is alleged the lead actors in the film, Kuno Becker (a Mexican), Jay Hernandez (American) and Jason Scott Lee (an American) spoke English in their scenes with the Russian and Kazakh being dubbed over the top by voiceover artists. However, the international release of the film in the English language featured dubbed English over the top of Kazakh language rather than the original English audio spoken by the actors. The linguistic shift to more films having Kazakh as the primary language seems to have occurred after the release of Nomad. 
^20	  Kazakh is enshrined in the constitution as the ‘national’ language  with Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication.
^21	  Author’s interview with Slambek Tauyekel, KazakhFilm Director, Almaty, Kazakhstan 6 November 2012.
^22	  Author’s interview Oleg Boretskii.
^23	  Author’s interview with Slambek Tauyekel.
^24	  Author’s interview with Satybaldy Narymbetov.
^25	  Author’s interview with Aldikhan Yerzhanov, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 5 November 2012.
^26	  Author’s interview Oleg Boretskii
^27	  Author’s interview with Ermek Tursunov, Almaty, Kazakhstan 8 November 2012.
^28	  Author’s interview with Gulnara Abikeyeva.
^29	  Author’s interview Oleg Boretskii.
^30	  Yerzhanov’s first film Realtors (2011) was a Kazakhfilm production as was Abishev’s Butter (2012) Constructors (2013), however, was funded by the Soros foundation in Kazakhstan and the Network for the Promotion of Asian cinema.
^31	  Author’s interview with Aldikhan Yerzhanov.
